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ABSTRACT 
 
Numerous studies have confirmed that race plays an important role in shaping public preferences 
toward both redistribution and punishment. Likewise, studies suggest that punitive policy tools tend to be 
adopted by state governments in a pattern that tracks with the racial composition of state populations. 
Such evidence testifies to the enduring power of race in American politics, yet it has limited value for 
understanding how disciplinary policies get applied to individuals in implementation settings. To 
illuminate the relationship between race and the application of punitive policy tools, we analyze sanction 
patterns in the TANF program. Drawing on a model of racial classification and policy choice, we test four 
hypotheses regarding client race and sanctioning. Our study does not support a simple story in which 
racial minorities are always more likely to be targeted for discipline. Rather, we find the impact of race to 
be contingent on local politics, administrative decentralization, and other client characteristics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Punishment is a core technology of governance, central to the modern state. It is usually most 
visible in criminal justice systems, where authorities penalize violations of law by imposing fines, stays of 
imprisonment, and even sentences of death. Yet as a tool of governance, punishment has far broader 
application. Across diverse societal domains, disciplinary systems establish behavioral incentives (Ehrlich 
1996) and shape the ways individuals understand and regulate their own conduct (Foucault 1979).  
In recent years, punishment has taken on greater significance for students of American politics, as 
governments at all levels in the United States have come to rely more heavily on punitive tools. This is 
evidenced by the increasing harshness of criminal justice policies, and the impact that these policies have 
had on the use of imprisonment. This has contributed to a level of mass incarceration that is 
unprecedented in American history and unrivaled by other nations (Western 2006). Yet, this custodial 
turn has not been isolated to criminal justice policies. Rather, it has coincided with a broader shift toward 
paternalist principles in U.S. social policy (Starobin 1998). Policies for low-income populations, in 
particular, have been redesigned around the idea that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
socially marginal groups practice appropriate behavior. Today, public aid programs are more directive in 
setting behavioral expectations, supervisory in monitoring compliance, and punitive in responding to 
infractions (Wacquant 2001).  
As disciplinary systems have come to play a more central role in poverty governance, the study of 
administrative practice has taken on greater urgency (Mead 2004). Because public benefits are now more 
contingent on recipient behavior, policy implementers have had to reorganize their operations around the 
tasks of identifying and penalizing rule violators. Indeed, it is inevitably at the frontlines of policy 
implementation – in concrete organizations such as courts, schools, prisons and welfare agencies – that 
the politics of punishment culminates in actual decisions to impose penalties on some but not others. 
 To understand discipline as an element of governance, then, political scientists must do more than 
explain why mass publics or political jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they embrace punitive 
policy designs. We must investigate how such designs are actually put into practice and, in so doing, 
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clarify the social, political, economic, and organizational forces that shape decisions to discipline. It is 
here, in the operation of administrative discretion, that the state’s capacity to punish collides with the core 
question of distributive politics posed by Harold Lasswell (1936): “who gets what, when, how?” 
This article presents an analysis of discipline at the frontlines of welfare reform, focusing on how 
patterns of punishment are affected by the interplay of race and politics. In the United States, there is a 
long history of social-policy tools being applied to racial groups in unequal ways (Lieberman 1998; 
Katznelson 2005). Today, however, the age of Jim Crow is a distant memory; de jure discrimination is 
banned; and norms of racial equality are widely embraced (Mendelberg 2001). In this post-civil-rights 
context, how and why does race matter for disciplinary action in local welfare offices? Under what 
conditions do client racial characteristics become significant influences on decisions to impose penalties?  
In recent years, numerous studies have confirmed that racial attitudes remain an important 
determinant of public preferences regarding both social programs and systems of punishment (Gilens 
1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Likewise, studies suggest that punitive policy tools tend to 
be adopted in the American states in a pattern that tracks with the racial composition of state populations 
(Fellows and Rowe 2004; Hero 1998; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Soss et al. 2001). Such evidence 
testifies to the enduring power of race in American politics, yet it has limited value for understanding how 
disciplinary policies actually get applied to individuals in implementation settings.  
To illuminate the relationship between race and the application of punitive policy tools, we 
analyze sanction patterns in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. When 
federal lawmakers passed welfare reform in 1996, they required states to develop procedures for 
sanctioning TANF clients. Sanctions are penalties that suspend all or part of a family’s benefits for failing 
to comply with a program requirement. Although they have existed as a policy tool in the welfare domain 
for many years, they have taken on a more central programmatic role since 1996, as clients have 
confronted stricter work obligations, narrower exemption criteria, expanded behavioral requirements, and 
stronger penalties for noncompliance (Hasenfeld, Ghose and Larson 2004). Sanctions impose highly 
visible, direct material consequences for behavioral infractions. They provide the primary mode of 
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disciplinary action in state TANF programs and, as such, are among the most potent tools that case 
managers have for influencing client behaviors and pursuing performance goals.  
Prior research has shown that states with higher proportions of nonwhite recipients have been 
significantly more likely to adopt the strictest sanction policies under welfare reform (Soss et al. 2001; 
Fellowes and Rowe 2004). Government records suggest that such racial dynamics may characterize the 
sanction implementation process as well. Using data from the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), one can examine the relationship between the racial composition of the welfare caseload and 
sanction usage in the states that have adopted the strictest sanction policies. Doing so, we find a strong 
relationship between the percentage of TANF recipients who are black or Latino and the extent to which 
states impose sanctions (see Figure 1). Figure 1 suggests a relationship between race and sanctioning 
outcomes, yet these aggregate state-level data are extremely limited. They do not allow us to determine if 
states are actually sanctioning black and Latino recipients more often than whites, and they tell us nothing 
about how, when, and why client race might matter for the use of penalties under welfare reform. To 
pursue such issues, one must examine individual-level data within a research design that maximizes our 
ability to understand if and why racial disparities exist in sanction implementation. 
[Figure 1] 
Drawing on a general model of racial classification and policy choice, we begin our investigation 
by developing the logic underlying four hypotheses regarding client race and sanctioning in the TANF 
program. We then proceed to test our hypotheses by using two very different, yet complimentary datasets. 
We begin with an analysis of longitudinal data on TANF clients from the state of Florida’s Welfare 
Transition (WT) program, a welfare-to-work program funded by the TANF block grant. As the 
centerpiece of federal welfare reform in 1996, state TANF programs have been at the heart of the recent 
turn toward paternalist social policy. The Florida WT program, in turn, has been at the leading edge of 
state efforts to use sanctions as a tool to motivate behavioral compliance and change (see Figure 1). We 
supplement this analysis with a cross-sectional analysis of TANF sanctioning using a national dataset, 
which allows us to provide a partial replication of our results from Florida. Our findings are consistent 
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across both analyses and suggest that race has played an important role in sanction implementation under 
welfare reform. However, our results do not support a simple story in which racial minorities are always 
more likely to be targeted for discipline. Rather, our findings support a more nuanced account in which 
the impact of race is contingent on local politics and administrative decentralization, as well as other 
client characteristics.  
POLITICS, CHOICE, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TANF SANCTIONS 
A variety of studies have used administrative or survey data to analyze the client characteristics 
that correlate with a higher likelihood of being sanctioned. Their findings converge on the conclusion that 
sanctioned participants tend to resemble long-term welfare participants across a variety of characteristics 
such as marital status, age, family size, education level, job experience, and most importantly for our 
purposes, race (Wu et al. 2006; Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh 2003; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Larson 2004; Kalil 
et al. 2002; Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Koraleck 2000; Westra and Routely 2000;).  
The existing literature is creative and sophisticated in its use of econometric methods. Yet it is 
also limited by its attention to only one side of a two-sided transaction. With only a few exceptions (e.g. 
Keiser, Meuser, and Choi 2004), previous studies have trained their attention on clients and asked, at least 
implicitly, “who is likely to get sanctioned?” As a result, these studies largely ignore the fact that welfare 
sanctions arise, not just from client characteristics and behaviors, but also from policy choices made by a 
series of political actors such as state and local representatives, program directors, supervisors, and case 
managers. The rate and incidence of sanctioning depend, at least in part, on the decisions such actors 
make as they set policy, organize administrative practice, and apply general rules to specific instances. In 
short, research to date has largely failed to address sanctions as tools of governance that may or may not 
be deployed depending on what officials choose in particular jurisdictions and cases.   
The sanctions deployed at the frontlines of welfare agencies are products of choice at numerous 
levels of governance. Under federal welfare reform, states confronted a range of options in designing their 
sanction policies. Seventeen adopted “immediate full-family sanctions,” which suspend all benefits for all 
members of the TANF family as penalty for the first instance of noncompliance. Fifteen chose “gradual 
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full-family sanctions,” which can eventually rise to a “full-family” impact, but only after a progression of 
penalties. The remaining states selected “partial sanctions,” which reduce only a portion – typically the 
adult portion – of the family’s benefits (Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh 2003). Studies suggest that these 
choices have been quite consequential, and as a result, the decline in the welfare caseload has been as 
much as 25 percent greater in states with immediate full-family sanctions, compared to states with the 
least punitive sanction policies (Rector and Youseff 1999).  
The politics of policy choice is equally crucial at the local level, where a variety of officials hold 
responsibility for interpreting state sanction policy and specifying it through rulemaking. Many states 
have practiced “second-order devolution” where they devolved primary authority over TANF policy 
down to county government officials or regional workforce boards (Gainesborough 2003). In all states, 
however, local TANF officials are likely to have substantial discretion over program elements that affect 
the rate and incidence of sanctioning. Their local policy choices typically establish the process by which 
clients are informed of TANF rules and penalty procedures; the mode of monitoring participation in 
required activities; the steps for initiating a sanction, including how and when clients are notified of an 
impending sanction and the steps needed to avoid it; and the procedures and requirements for “curing” a 
sanction and returning a client to the TANF rolls. Not surprisingly, given the wide scope of this 
discretion, field studies find that, even when TANF offices operate under the same state guidelines, 
sanction philosophies and practices tend to vary dramatically across local communities (Pavetti et al. 
1998).     
State and local policy choices combine to create the settings for more proximate decision 
processes in the interactions between case managers and clients.  As frontline workers, case managers 
exercise significant discretion in interpreting program rules and applying penalties (Myers et al. 2006; 
Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh 2003: 6). Their decisions can influence sanction patterns in a variety of ways. 
From the outset, case managers are responsible for assessing client needs and capabilities. They identify 
which clients should be relieved of certain work requirements or told to attend special classes. In doing 
so, the case manager establishes particular sanctioning parameters for particular clients.  And of course, 
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ultimately, it is the case manager who must decide whether to initiate sanction procedures in response to 
an infraction and whether the circumstances of the infraction justify a “good cause” exception to the rules.  
In short, sanctions can be understood, not just as events that happen to some clients more than 
others (as in most of the current literature), but also as outcomes of governmental decision-making 
processes. From this perspective, the analytic focus shifts from an investigation of client characteristics 
per se to an investigation of how client characteristics become relevant to administrative decisions and 
interact with the environmental forces that systematically shape administrative behavior. In what follows, 
we pursue exactly this approach, investigating how client racial characteristics combine with stereotype-
consistent cues and local political environments to influence frontline decisions to impose sanctions.  
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND THE LOCAL POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT 
Our analysis is based on a simple but general model of race and social policy choice called the 
Racial Classification Model (RCM). Elaborating on the work of Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997), the 
RCM identifies how and when racial classifications should affect target-group constructions and, hence, 
policy design and implementation patterns. The model does not preclude but, crucially, does not assume 
the operation of racial animus, racial threat, or racial group loyalty.   It is a minimalist cognitive model of 
policy decision making that focuses solely on the necessity of social classification and consequences of 
group reputation. Here, we apply the model to policy implementation settings by deriving four hypotheses 
regarding TANF sanctions. The RCM consists of three basic premises. 
1.  To be effective in designing policies and applying policy tools to specific target groups, policy actors 
must rely on salient social classifications and group reputations; without such classifications, they 
would be unable to bring coherence to a complex social world or determine appropriate action.  
 
2. When racial minorities are salient in a policy context, race will be more likely to provide a salient 
basis for social classification of targets and, hence, to signify target differences perceived as relevant 
to the accomplishment of policy goals.  
 
3. The likelihood of racially patterned policy outcomes will be positively associated with the degree of 
policy-relevant contrast in policy actors’ perceptions of racial groups. The degree of contrast, in turn, 
will be a function of (a) the prevailing cultural stereotypes of racial groups, (b) the extent to which 
policy actors hold relevant group stereotypes, and (c) the presence or absence of stereotype-consistent 
cues. 
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The RCM asserts that policy actors try to choose courses of action that they expect to be effective 
given what they believe about the specific groups they aim to address. In this process, social group 
characteristics can serve as proxies for more detailed information about a policy’s intended target group. 
When race is salient to a policy area, as in the case of welfare (Gilens 1999), racial classifications can 
serve precisely this function, regardless of whether racial animus is present and regardless of the decision 
makers’ own racial identities. In such cases, group reputations can frame interpretations of ambiguous 
policy-target behaviors and cue broad assumptions about what kinds of policy actions are likely to be 
effective. The effects of such reputations, however, will depend on their specific policy-relevant content 
as well as situational factors that may strengthen or weaken their utility as information proxies. 
In applying the RCM to TANF sanction decisions, we conceptualize sanctions as tools for 
motivating welfare clients, stimulating work effort, and enforcing responsible behavior. Accordingly, 
local policy actors should be more likely to organize and implement sanctions in a stringent fashion when 
TANF clients are perceived as less motivated and responsible in their own right – i.e., when clients are 
perceived as needing a stronger external stimulus to follow program rules and achieve welfare-to-work 
goals. In this context, client race should affect sanctioning patterns to the extent that contrasts between 
racial-group reputations convey information about motivation, work effort, and personal responsibility.  
Combining these assumptions with research on group stereotypes in the United States, we can 
derive our first hypothesis from the RCM. Relative to white Americans, black Americans remain strongly 
associated with low work effort and motivation, socially irresponsible behavior, and preferences for 
welfare reliance (Gilens 1999; Schuman et al. 1997). Stereotypes of Latinos occupy a midpoint, less 
negative than blacks but more negative than whites (Fox 2004). Accordingly, the RCM suggests:  
(H1) The Simple Disparity Hypothesis: All else equal, TANF officials will be more likely to sanction black 
clients than white or Latino clients, and more likely to sanction Latino clients than white clients.   
 
Taken in isolation, H1 might be read as predicting that client race will have a significant and 
invariant effect in all circumstances. The third premise of the RCM, however, points to a more situational 
effect, with the impact of client race depending on both the degree to which policy actors hold relevant 
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group stereotypes and the presence or absence of stereotype-consistent cues. These elements of the RCM 
allow us to move beyond simple disparities to specify and test more nuanced hypotheses.  
Two individuals who are perceived as members of the same racial group may nevertheless be 
associated with quite different group reputations. Research on intersectionality, for example, emphasizes 
that the meaning of one category of social identity can be altered when combined with another (e.g., when 
woman is combined with black as opposed to white, see Crenshaw 1991; Hancock 2006). Likewise, 
social cognition researchers have shown that perceivers tend to distinguish “subtypes” of racial groups 
(such as “ghetto blacks” vs. “black businessmen”) and to attribute negative global-group traits to these 
subtypes to very different degrees (Richards and Hewstone 2001; Devine and Baker 1991). As a result, 
race-of-target effects will often be contingent on additional characteristics that strengthen or weaken the 
individual’s connection to the racial group’s prevailing reputation. Eberhardt et al. (2006), for example, 
find that black defendants convicted of killing white victims are more likely to receive the death penalty if 
they are perceived as having a “stereotypically black appearance.” 
Indeed, research suggests that a variety of stereotype-consistent cues can enhance race-based 
disadvantages. In some instances, this effect functions to widen already-existing racial disparities. In 
others, it creates disparities where none had otherwise existed. The former scenario is well illustrated by 
Pager’s (2003) influential field experiment exploring the effects of race and “the mark of a criminal 
record” on hiring outcomes. Pager (2003) finds that black job applicants are already disadvantaged 
relative to whites in the no-felony condition of her experiment, yet the attribution of a felony conviction 
actually reduces black applicants’ job prospects to a greater degree than the prospects of already-
advantaged white applicants. By contrast, the latter scenario is illustrated by a recent study of how racial 
cues affect preferences for political candidates. Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002: 86) find that  
When the black racial cues are stereotype-inconsistent, the relationship between racial 
attitudes and the vote disappears…. [Likewise] the presence of black images alone… does 
not prime negative racial attitudes…. The effect emerges only when the pairing of the 
visuals with the narrative subtly reinforces negative stereotypes in the mind of the viewer. 
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Building on this research, the RCM suggests that, regardless of whether simple racial disparities 
exist, the presence of a trait that is consistent with minority-group stereotypes should increase the odds of 
a sanction more for minority clients than for white clients. In the present analysis, perhaps the most 
relevant trait of this sort is long-term welfare usage (Gilens 1999). For several decades now, welfare 
“dependency” has been a prominent stereotype associated with poor racial minorities – interpreted in 
various quarters as a distinguishing feature of “underclass” culture, a pathology akin to addiction, and a 
clear sign of an individual’s unwillingness to work (Schram 1995). To stay on the welfare rolls for a 
comparatively long period of time is, in the context of welfare-to-work programs, to mark oneself in a 
policy-relevant and racially-inflected way. Accordingly, the RCM suggests: 
(H2) The Time-Contingent Disparity Hypothesis:  The effects of race on sanctioning will grow stronger, 
and thus the racial disparities predicted under H1 will grow larger, as TANF participation spells 
increase in length. 
 
The third premise of the RCM also predicts that the production of racial disparities will be 
contingent on the extent to which policy actors hold relevant group stereotypes. When such stereotypes 
are viewed with skepticism, racial-group reputations will be perceived as poor proxies for more detailed 
information and, hence, as unreliable guides to decisions regarding policy targets. By contrast, when such 
stereotypes are accepted as largely valid, differences in group reputation should convey more useful 
information and, thus, the likelihood of racially patterned outcomes should increase.   
Ideally, one would like to test this component of the RCM by utilizing direct measures of 
stereotype acceptance at the individual level. In the absence of such measures, one must seek out a 
suitable proxy by asking where in American society one is likely to find greater acceptance of stereotypes 
regarding racial-group orientations toward work and welfare. As an empirical matter, one answer to this 
question is that such stereotypes are more likely to be found in politically conservative communities than 
in politically liberal communities. There is, of course, no logical reason why conservatives should hold 
more negative views of racial minorities. Indeed, there are good reasons to distinguish between the two 
when trying to explain public opposition to various policies designed to advance egalitarian goals (Sears, 
Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). Nevertheless, two basic empirical observations emerge as uncontroversial in 
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the existing literature. First, conservatives are more likely than liberals to oppose welfare and to hold 
negative views of welfare recipients (Gilens 1999; Cook and Barrett 1992). Second, conservatives are 
more likely than liberals to hold negative stereotypes of African Americans, especially in attributing to 
this group a preference for receiving welfare rather than working (Domke 2001; Federico and Sidanius 
2002; Gilens 1999; Glaser 1994; Johnson and Marini 1998; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000).  
This relationship can be easily documented with recent data from the National Election Study 
(NES).  In 2004, the NES asked respondents to evaluate the degree to which different racial and ethnic 
groups (including blacks, Latinos, and whites) were either “hardworking” or “lazy.” Figure 2 presents the 
difference in the average assessment of each group’s perceived “laziness” (on the vertical axis), by 
respondents’ liberal-conservative identification (on the horizontal axis), thus allowing a direct 
examination of the relationship between ideological orientations and group stereotypes.   
[Figure 2] 
The results are clear. Conservatives are more likely than liberals or moderates to view blacks and 
Latinos as lazy, compared to whites. As a result, the perceived gap between group reputations grows 
consistently larger as one shifts from the liberal to the conservative end of the ideological spectrum. One 
need not engage the thorny causal questions of why this relationship exists to pursue our present analytic 
goals. It suffices to say that there is an empirical basis for assuming that, in more conservative political 
environments, one is more likely to find negative views of welfare reliance and acceptance of stereotypes 
asserting that racial minorities differ from whites in preferring welfare over work. 
Combining this observation with the RCM leads to the expectation that racial disparities in 
sanctioning will be larger in more politically conservative communities. A variety of mechanisms may 
underlie this relationship. Because case managers tend to be drawn from local communities, one would 
expect them to be more conservative (and hence, more likely to perceive racial-group differences in 
welfare-work orientations) when their offices are located in more conservative environments. The same 
selection dynamics are likely to operate for TANF supervisors, program directors, and governing board 
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members. As a result, racial disparities in sanctioning may arise more often in conservative communities, 
not only due to the attitudes of individual case managers, but also due to the possibility that racial 
classifications may guide the officials above them who set local operating procedures and manage TANF 
implementation. Finally, because welfare agencies are “open systems” that must respond to their political 
environments, conservative and liberal communities may produce different patterns of program 
implementation because of the ways that racialized understandings inform political pressures, standards 
of legitimacy, and agendas for action. For all these reasons, the RCM suggests: 
(H3) The Ideology-Contingent Disparity Hypothesis:  The effects of race on sanctioning will be stronger, 
and thus the racial disparities predicted under H1 will be larger, in conservative political environments. 
 
Finally, we offer a fourth hypothesis which predicts that the causal mechanisms assumed by the 
RCM will have the strongest effect on implementation outcomes in administrative environments which 
offer greater discretion to local decisionmakers and frontline workers. As discussed above, many states 
have devolved significant authority in TANF implementation to local governments or regional workforce 
boards – a process known as second-order devolution (SOD) (Gainsborough 2003). Under SOD, states 
grant administrative authority to local governments just as the federal government grants authority and 
responsibility to state governments in designing and implementing TANF (Nathan, 1997; Adkisson, 
1998). Although the division of state-local responsibility varies across SOD states, it is generally agreed 
that in SOD states, local TANF administrators and frontline staff enjoy greater freedom from state control 
and thus have the opportunity to exercise significantly greater discretion in the implementation of TANF 
(Fording, Soss and Schram 2007). Therefore, it is likely that the effects of racial classification may be 
enhanced in SOD states, and as a result, racial classification may more likely to result in racial disparities 
in sanctioning outcomes. This leads to our final hypothesis: 
(H4) The Decentralization-Contingent Disparity Hypothesis:  The effects of race on sanctioning will be 
stronger, and thus the racial disparities predicted under H1 will be larger, in states which have chosen to 
engage in second order devolution. 
 
 To date, we are aware of only one study that has examined the effects of both race and the 
political environment on TANF sanctioning.  Keiser, Mueser and Choi (2004) analyze administrative data 
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on sanctioning in Missouri, finding that after one controls for relevant client-level and county-level 
factors, blacks are on average 23 percent more likely to be sanctioned than white recipients. Moreover, 
the authors find that the magnitude of racial differences varies across seven geographic regions in a 
pattern that they interpret as politically meaningful. Yet, as a test of the RCM’s predictions, Keiser, 
Meuser, and Choi’s analysis has significant limitations.  
Because of small sample sizes, the authors could only examine how racial effects varied across a 
small number of geographic groupings (seven), all of which were defined at a high level of aggregation 
and some of which were non-contiguous. As a result, they were unable to test whether differences in 
racial effects correlated with any direct measure of political ideology (H3). In addition, because Keiser, 
Meuser, and Choi relied on binary logit analysis rather than event history analysis, they were unable to 
test hypotheses related to spell length (H2) and their analysis of racial disparities offered only a limited 
ability to control for differences in at-risk periods across groups (see Wu et al. 2006). Finally, by 
examining a single state operating in a centralized administrative environment, not only is their analysis 
limited in external validity, it cannot test for differences in racial effects due to variation in administrative 
decentralization (H4). 
Our analysis follows Keiser, Mueser and Choi (2004) in that we examine the individual and 
contextual determinants of sanctioning using administrative data. However, we build on their analysis in 
several important ways. First, by examining sanctioning in the state of Florida, where the minority 
population is not only sizeable but widely dispersed, we are able to examine racial effects across a large 
number of geographic contexts at a lower level of aggregation that is both administratively and politically 
meaningful (the county). As a result, we can directly test the interaction of local political ideology and 
client racial characteristics. Second, because Florida is a racially diverse state, we are able to examine 
disparities in sanctioning across blacks, whites, and Latinos. Third, by modeling sanctions using an event 
history design, we are able to control for group differences in at-risk periods and directly test the 
hypothesis that racial disparities will grow across the length of the welfare spell. And finally, by 
extending our analysis to national data on TANF sanctions, we are not only able to test for the effects of 
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administrative decentralization, but we are able to provide a level of external validity that is absent in 
prior studies of sanctioning. 
RACE AND SANCTIONING IN THE FLORIDA TANF PROGRAM:  
AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
We have selected the Florida WT program for our study, not because it is typical of all state 
TANF programs, but because it provides close to an ideal setting for analyzing how race and politics 
affect local differences in the use of penalties. Since 1996, Florida, as a practitioner of “second-order 
devolution,” has constructed one of the most decentralized TANF programs in the country. Frontline 
services have been contracted out to public, non-profit, and for-profit providers throughout the state, and 
primary authority over the WT program has shifted down to 24 local public/private “Regional Workforce 
Boards” (RWBs). These RWBs are responsible for strategic planning, policy development, contracting, 
and oversight of local one-stop delivery systems. Several of the regions encompass more than one county; 
and the regional boards set policy in a way that allows for county offices to have some discretion in 
implementing policies. The regional boards are overseen, not by state agencies, but by a statewide 
public/private partnership called Workforce Florida, Inc. (WFI).  The Florida Department of Children and 
Families (DCF), a conventional state agency, receives the federal TANF block grant and maintains 
responsibility for eligibility determination. But otherwise, Florida stands out among American states for 
its emphasis on local control and privatization within a work-oriented TANF program (Botsko et al. 2001: 
7).  
Florida also scores high on factors that raise the importance of sanction decision processes. After 
1996, Florida adopted “some of the strictest time limits and work requirements in the nation” and 
broadened the pool of clients subject to sanctions by creating “few possibilities for exemptions” (Botsko 
et al. 2001: 4). The sanctions themselves also fall at the strong end of the continuum, resulting in an 
immediate, full-family loss of TANF benefits and a reduction of Food Stamp benefits to the fullest extent 
permitted by federal law (Botsko et al. 2001: 6). Moreover, as we can see in Figure 1, Florida employs 
sanctions at an extremely high rate compared to other states with full-family sanctions. Thus, it is not 
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surprising to find that Florida DCF identified sanctions as the most common cause of TANF case closings 
in fiscal year 2003, accounting for 31 percent of closings vs. 21 percent for increased earnings.  
The selection of Florida also aids our analysis because it offers significant variation on the two 
most critical independent variables in our study: race and local political environment.  Florida is one of 
the most racially diverse states in the country, with sizeable black and Latino populations, and the state’s 
TANF population displays even more diversity. Between January 2000 and March 2004, 36.2% of TANF 
adults were black, 33.7% were white (non-Latino), and 28.5% were Latino. In addition, Florida is a 
politically diverse state, a fact clearly reflected in recent presidential elections. Over the last three 
presidential elections, the average Democratic share of the two-party vote across Florida’s 67 counties has 
been approximately 44%, with a healthy standard deviation of 9.2%. The most conservative counties have 
supported Republicans by a strong majority, with the Republican vote share as high as 75% in some 
counties (e.g. Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Clay).  The most liberal counties have likewise supported Democrats 
by a significant margin, with Broward and Gadsen counties leading the way (66% and 69% Democratic 
vote share, respectively).  In combination with Florida’s heavy emphasis on sanctioning and decentralized 
approach to welfare provision, this variation in race and ideology provides an ideal setting for a study of 
the joint effects of race and ideology on local sanction implementation.  
Data and Methods 
Our sample consists of individual-level administrative data for all new adult TANF clients who 
entered WT during the 24-month period from January 2001 through December 2002,1 supplemented with 
contextual data indicating how local implementing environments vary across the state’s 67 counties. 
Thus, our entire period of analysis extends from January 2001 (first cohort enters) through November 
2003 (12th month of spell for last cohort). We follow each of the 24 cohorts for up to a maximum of 12 
consecutive months, ending our observations of the case at the spell’s termination or at the 12-month 
mark, whichever comes first. We restrict our attention to the first TANF spell for each individual during 
                                                 
1 We define “new” TANF clients as those clients who have spent at least twelve continuous months 
without TANF benefits.  
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this period, defined based on continuous months of TANF receipt. As defined, and accounting for a small 
percentage of cases for which values on some variables are missing, our total sample size exceeds 74,000 
individuals who were subject to over 28,000 sanctions across approximately 200,000 person-month 
observations.  
As our data consist of variables that are measured at two levels of analysis (individual and 
county), we examine the determinants of sanction usage by employing a discrete-time multilevel event 
history analysis of the initiation of a sanction (Barber et al. 2000). Our dependent variable is Sanctiontjk  - 
a dichotomous variable which indicates whether or not client j, residing in county k has been sanctioned 
in month t. We estimate our model using the logit link (i.e., as a hierarchical generalized linear model, or 
HGLM), and therefore the effects of the independent variables are additive and represent the change in 
the log odds of sanction. The independent variables include individual-level measures capturing client 
effects, and county-level measures capturing community-context effects.2 The individual-level (level 1) 
model is represented below in equation 1. 
Sanctiontjk  = β0k + β1k Blackj + β2k Latinoj + β3k (Blackj*Month of Spelltj)   
+ β4k (Latinoj*Month of Spelltj)  + β5k Number of Children(2)j  
+ β6k Number of Children(3 or more)j + β7k Age of Youngest Child(3 months-2 yrs.)j  
+ β8k Age of Youngest Child(3-4 years)j + β9k Age of Youngest Child(5-11 yrs.)j  
+ β10k Age of Youngest Child(12 or more)j + β11k Education(H.S.)j + β12k Education(>H.S.)j  
+  β13k Malej + β14k Citizenj + β15k Agej + β16k Single-Parentj + β17k Earned Incomej + β18k Month 2tj   
+ β19k Month 3tj  + β20k Month 4tj  + β21k Month 5tj  + β22k Month 6tj  + β23k Month 7tj   + β24k Month 8tj   
+ β25k Month 9tj  + β26k Month 10tj + β27k Month 11tj  + β28k Month 12tj          [1] 
 An important feature of a multilevel model is that the coefficients for the level 1 variables (the 
β’s in equation 1) are permitted to vary across our level 2 units (counties). Based on theoretical 
                                                 
2 We provide detailed variable descriptions, including data sources and descriptive statistics for each 
variable used in the analyses that follow in an unpublished Appendix, available at www.xxx.xxx. 
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expectations, the county-level variables therefore enter the level 2 model as explanatory variables for 
these effects. Our level 2 model is reflected below in equations 2-5 and reflects our theoretical 
expectations concerning the effects of county-level variables on the intercept (β0k) of equation 1 (i.e., the 
mean rate of sanctioning across counties), and on the slope values for Black and Latino (i.e. β1k and β2k). 
β0k =  γ00 + γ01Local Conservatismk + γ02Percent Blackk
                                                
 + γ03Percent Latinok +  γ04Annual Wagek  
+ γ05Unemployment Ratek  +  γ06Poverty Ratek  + γ07Populationj  + γ08TANF Caseloadj  +  ε0k     [2] 
β1k =  γ00 + γ01Local Conservatismk +  ε1k                                                           [3] 
β2k =  γ00 + γ01Local Conservatismk +  ε2k                     [4] 
βpk =  γp0       for p = 3-28                                           [5] 
Level 1 Hypotheses 
To test the simple disparity hypothesis, we classify clients as belonging to one of three mutually 
exclusive racial/ethnic group combinations: black, Latino, and white (non-Latino).3  We then include the 
dichotomous variables Black and Latino in our model of sanction initiation, where we expect the 
coefficient values in equation 1 will be positive for each of these variables (β1, β2 > 0), and the coefficient 
for Black will be larger than the coefficient for Latino (β1 > β2). We test the time-contingent disparity 
hypothesis by including two interaction terms in equation 1, Black*Month of Spell and Latino*Month of 
Spell, where we expect that the coefficients for these variables will be positive (β3, β4 > 0).  
Based on past research on sanctions and welfare implementation, we include a number of other 
variables to control for variation in clients’ individual characteristics. These include variables measuring 
the client’s sex (Male), citizenship status (Citizen), and age (Age). The age of the youngest child in the 
TANF family is measured by a series of categorical variables, as is the number of children in the TANF 
family. We include the client’s marital status (Single-Parent), and two indicators of human capital 
(Earned Income and Education). All of these variables have been found to be important determinants of 
 
3 We omit a very small percentage (<2%) of cases classified as “other race” by the state.  
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individual sanctioning outcomes in past research (Wu et al. 2006; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Larson 2004; 
Kalil et al. 2002; Mancuso and Lindler 2001).   
Finally, we include a series of dummy variables for each month of the spell to model the baseline 
hazard of sanction. This strategy has the advantage of leaving the shape of the baseline hazard function 
unspecified, which in this sense is analogous to the continuous-time formulation of the Cox proportional 
hazards model (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998).  
Level 2 Hypotheses 
We model the intercept of equation 1 (β0k) as a function of several different features of local 
political, economic and social environments. Due to the theoretical importance of local ideology for our 
analysis we rely on two alternative measurement strategies. First, for each of Florida’s 67 counties we 
coded election results for 18 ideologically-relevant constitutional amendments that appeared on the ballot 
throughout the entire state between 1996 and 2004. Based on a factor analysis of support for all 18 
amendments, we used factor scores to create an index of county conservatism that runs from 0 (most 
liberal county) to 1 (most conservative county). This index is labeled Local Conservatism and serves as 
our primary measure of the local political environment in Florida. As an alternative measure, we rely on 
the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote, averaged over the last three presidential elections. 
Because partisanship tends to be imperfectly related to political ideology (Miller 1999), we believe our 
amendment-based measure to be a more valid measure of local ideology. However, as we describe below, 
our key results are consistent regardless of the indicator we use, enhancing our confidence in the validity 
of our conclusions.4   
In addition to local political ideology, we consider one additional dimension of the local political 
environment: the local racial context. Previous studies have often found that racial context has a 
significant impact on racially relevant policy outcomes, either through the effects of a “racial threat” felt 
by the white majority (Key 1949), or the effects of increased minority political power (Keech 1968). 
                                                 
4 The simple correlation between our measure of county conservatism and our measure of the Republican 
vote share is reasonably strong at .65.  Details on the construction of our amendment-based measure of 
county ideology are provided in our unpublished Appendix. 
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Because there is reason to suspect that either effect might exist (see Keiser, Mueser and Choi 2004), we 
test for effects of community racial composition by including the percentage of the county population that 
is black and Latino, respectively (Percent Black, Percent Latino).  
Several additional measures capture the effects of local labor markets and employment 
opportunities, which we expect to affect sanctioning in one of two ways. First, where employment 
opportunities are relatively numerous and attractive, TANF clients may be more likely to work enough 
hours to avoid falling out of compliance with TANF rules. Alternatively, local labor market conditions 
may also influence the sanction decisions of case managers, who may be less inclined to sanction clients 
when job opportunities are less numerous or less attractive. To capture such effects, we include the county 
unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate), the county poverty rate (Poverty Rate), the level of 
urbanization (as measured by county population - Population), and the annual local wage in food 
service/drinking establishments (Annual Wage).  
We also include a measure of the county TANF Caseload, expressed as a proportion of the 
county’s population. As the caseload size increases, we might expect that, all else equal, administrative 
pressures to reduce the caseload would result in an increase in sanctioning. Alternatively, as the caseload 
size increases, if the number of case managers remains fixed, individual case managers may have less 
time to closely monitor TANF clients for violations of rules, thus resulting in a lower rate of sanctioning.   
Finally, we test the ideology-contingent disparity hypothesis by including Local Conservatism as 
a predictor for the effects of Black (β1k) and Latino (β2k), as reflected in equations 3 and 4. As we expect 
racial disparities to increase in conservative counties, we expect Local Conservatism to be positively 
related to the effects of Black (β1k) and Latino (β2k), and thus γ11 and γ21 > 0.  
Results 
Table 1 presents results for two versions of our event history model that differ only in the 
measure used to capture local ideological environment. For each version, we report both the coefficient 
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values and the associated odds ratios reflecting the proportional increase in the risk of sanction given a 
one-unit increase in the independent variable.  
We begin by examining the dynamics of sanctioning across the TANF spell, as reflected by the 
effects of the month-of-spell dummies in equation 1 (which collectively reflect the baseline hazard of 
sanctioning). For ease of interpretation, we do not report these results in Tables 1 and 2, but instead 
present a graphical display in Figure 3. The vertical axis of the figure is the odds ratio of sanction, based 
on the coefficient estimates for equation 1. Thus, for each month of the TANF spell reflected on the 
horizontal in Figure 3, the associated odds ratio reflects the relative odds of sanction, compared to the 
initial odds at month 1, for a client who has been on TANF throughout all of the preceding months, but 
has not yet been sanctioned. As can be seen, the risk of sanction steadily decreases throughout the TANF 
spell. Indeed, by month 5 of the spell the client’s risk of sanction has decreased by nearly 50% compared 
to month 1. 
[Figure 3] 
Next, we examine the results for our control variables. As expected, we find that sanctions are 
significantly related to clients’ individual traits in both specifications of our model. Specifically, TANF 
sanctions are significantly more likely to be applied to the small number of men in the program, relative 
to the large majority of women. The probability of being sanctioned is also higher for clients who are 
younger, who are heads of two-parent families, who have older children, who are citizens, and who 
possess less human capital (as measured by education level).  
[Table 1] 
Moving to our contextual variables, sanctioning appears to be significantly heavier in high-
poverty counties with large populations, yet significantly lower in counties with large TANF caseloads. 
We find weaker effects for other aspects of the local economic context: neither unemployment rates nor 
local wage levels prove to be consistent predictors. Nor do we find higher levels of minority presence in 
the community to affect local sanctioning rates. In sum, these results are largely consistent with the results 
of past studies, and therefore give us greater confidence in the results we report below (Wu et al. 2006; 
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Keiser, Mueser and Choi 2004; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Larson 2004; Kalil, Seefeldt and Wang 2002; 
Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Westra and Routely 2000;). 
Turning to an examination of our primary hypotheses, we begin with the simple disparity 
hypothesis predicting that (1) the coefficients for Black and Latino should be positive (reflecting 
significant black-white and Latino-white disparities in sanctioning), and (2) the coefficient for Black 
should be larger than the coefficient for Latino (due to the presumed larger gap in group reputations 
between blacks and whites). As specified, equation 1 models the effects of Black/Latino as interactive, 
and therefore conditional on spell duration and the local political environment. To ease interpretation, we 
transformed Local Conservatism, Republican Vote Share and Month of Spell by subtracting their means 
prior to estimation, so that the coefficients for Black and Latino in Tables 1 and 2 reflect the effects of 
race and ethnicity for clients who reside in a politically moderate county, and who are at a typical point in 
the TANF spell (month 3). As can be seen from the coefficient estimates in Table 1, we find mixed 
support for the simple disparity hypothesis. The coefficients for Black are statistically insignificant in 
both specifications, and while the coefficient for Latino is statistically significant, the direction of the 
effect is the opposite of what is expected and suggests that Latino clients are sanctioned at a rate that is 
lower rate than whites and blacks alike.   
By contrast, the results in Tables 1 offer strong support for the time-contingent disparity 
hypothesis, as revealed by the significant interactions between race/ethnicity of client and a simple 
counter variable (1-12) representing the month of the current TANF spell (Black*Month of Spell, 
Latino*Month of Spell). This interaction between race/ethnicity and month of spell is extremely robust 
across both specifications of our model and underscores the importance of employing a longitudinal 
design, such as event history analysis, to study racial dynamics in TANF sanctioning.  
We now turn our attention to the ideology-contingent disparity hypothesis, which predicts that 
sanctioning disparities are conditioned by the political environment in which TANF is implemented. Our 
test of this hypothesis is based on the estimation of cross-level interactions between the racial/ethnic 
status of the client and our measures of local ideology (Local Conservatism in Model 1 and Republican 
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Vote Share in Model 2). The results reported in Table 1 strongly support our hypothesis. The effects of 
racial/ethnic status are indeed mediated by the ideological orientation of the local political environment. 
Not only is this the case regardless of which measure of local political ideology we use, we also find the 
mediating effect of ideological climate to be statistically significant for both black and Latino clients 
(although the effect is only weakly significant for Latino clients in Model 1). For both groups (blacks and 
Latinos), movement from a liberal local environment to a conservative environment raises the probability 
of being sanctioned, not just in absolute terms, but also relative to that of white non-Latinos.5 Given the 
complexity of the results presented in Table 1 (due to interactions between race, time and ideology), we 
present a series of graphical interpretations of these effects below in Figures 4 and 5.6 
In Figure 4 we present three graphs of the predicted probability of sanction for “typical” black 
and white clients, for months 3, 6 and 9 of the TANF spell.7 In each graph, the probability of sanction is 
plotted against our measure of local conservatism, thus allowing us to see how the risk of sanction varies 
across the entire range of local ideological context for both black and white clients. Figure 4 reveals 
several interesting features of the relationship between race and sanctioning. We can see that as we move 
from month 3 to month 9 in of the TANF spell, the overall risk of sanction decreases for both blacks and 
whites (as reflected by the decreasing intercept values of the curves in the graphs). This is expected given 
the pattern of the baseline hazard reported in Figure 1. However, this decrease in the rate of sanctioning is 
not consistent across racial groups as whites display a significantly greater reduction in the risk of 
sanction than blacks as spell duration increases. This pattern is anticipated given the significant 
interaction between race and month of spell in our results.  
                                                 
5 One possible explanation for these results is that it is not ideology but rather the size of the minority 
population that mediates the effect of client race on sanctioning. To explore this possibility, we tested for 
interactions between racial/ethnic status of client and the black and Latino percentage of the county 
population (i.e. Black*Black% and Latino*Latino%). Neither term was statistically significant. 
6 All illustrations are based on the results from Table 1. Similar patterns are observed when we use 
Republican Vote Share as our measure of local ideology. 
7 We define a “typical” client as a U.S.-born 31 year-old single woman with 2 children (aged 5-12 years), 
less than 12 years of education an average level of earned income, who resides in an average county 
(reflecting mean values on all of the contextual variables).   
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[Figure 4] 
Figure 4 also allows us to see how black-white disparities in sanctioning vary across the level of 
local conservatism. In all three graphs, we see that as we move from the most liberal to the most 
conservative environments, the probability of a black client being sanctioned, relative to that of a white 
client, increases. However, the pattern of racial disparities changes in a substantively meaningful way as 
the spell length increases. For clients in the third month of a TANF spell, we see that in liberal counties, 
white clients are significantly more likely to be sanctioned than black clients for a large majority of 
clients. Only in the most conservative counties does the predicted probability of sanction for blacks 
exceed that of whites. As the length of the spell grows longer, however, black clients become consistently 
more likely to experience a sanction than their white counterparts. Indeed, by the 9th month of the spell, 
black clients are predicted to be sanctioned more than whites in every county, and at a rate that is 
approximately 70% higher than that of whites in the most conservative counties 
Figure 5 consists of three identically constructed graphs comparing predicted probabilities for 
Latino clients and white clients. As can be seen, we observe several similarities between Figures 4 and 5 
in the pattern of racial/ethnic disparities. The risk of sanction for a Latino client, relative to that of a white 
client, increases as spell length increases, and as one moves from a liberal to a conservative political 
climate. However, the magnitude of these changes in patterns of Latino-white disparities across these two 
contexts seems smaller than what we observe for black clients in Figure 4. This is largely consistent with 
our theoretical assumptions regarding relatively smaller reputational gaps between Latinos and whites, 
(see Figure 2), and in this sense provides additional support for our hypotheses.8 
[Figure 5] 
 
                                                 
8 We have replicated the analyses presented in Table 1 using two alternative estimation techniques used to 
analyze multilevel data – logistic regression with clustered standard errors (by county), and a 2-stage 
regression method. These results confirm the interaction between Black Client and Local Conservatism, 
but unlike the HLM results, also find a significant interaction between Hispanic Client and Local 
Conservatism. We do not present these results in this paper as we have the most confidence in the HLM 
results presented in this paper. However, we do provide these results for interested readers in our 
unpublished appendix to this paper. 
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Extending our Results Using National TANF Data 
 Thus far, our analysis of Florida TANF clients provides strong support for our racial 
classification model of policy choice.  Yet, due our examination of a single state, we are unable to test 
Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the effects of race/ethnicity will be stronger in states that rely on 
second-order devolution in TANF implementation. In addition, there may be reason to doubt the external 
validity of our findings from Florida due to our focus on sanctioning patterns a single state. To address 
these issues, we now turn to an analysis of sanctioning that incorporates individual-level data from all 50 
states, available from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) in the 
Department of Health and Human Services. 
The ASPE data consists of a series of state samples of TANF families collected by all 50 states 
from 1999 through 2005. These data are used by the federal government for annual state performance 
evaluations, and consist of two types of samples – active cases and closed cases. In addition to variables 
measuring clients’ personal characteristics, the closed case samples also provide information concerning 
the reason that the case was closed. Such reasons may include leaving welfare for employment, getting 
married, and being sanctioned, among others. We therefore rely on these data from the closed case 
samples to construct our dependent variable. Given that we limit the analysis to closed cases, we expect to 
find some differences compared to the Florida sample that includes open as well as closed cases. Yet, 
there is reason to think that sanction exits in this population are affected as we have hypothesized.  For 
our analysis, we pool all closed case samples for the entire 1999-2005 period. We restrict our analysis to 
all adult TANF recipients who were identified as the head of the household by the state. Using this 
definition, and accounting for some missing data, our final dataset consists of approximately 195,000 
TANF adults, residing in nearly 2,700 different counties. Unfortunately, these data are purely cross-
sectional in nature, and therefore we cannot exactly replicate our analysis of sanctioning in Florida using 
nationally representative data. However, these data do allow us to provide a strong test of the effects of 
decentralized administration, as well as a limited replication of our tests of the simple disparity hypothesis 
and the ideology-contingent disparity hypothesis.  
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Our dependent variable is Sanction Exitjk - a dichotomous variable which indicates whether or not 
client j, residing in county k left TANF due to a sanction. We model the probability of a sanction exit as a 
function of both individual level and contextual (county) variables. Therefore, we estimate a (cross-
sectional) multilevel model, using a logit link (as our dependent variable is dichotomous). The individual-
level (level 1) model is represented below in equation 6. 
Sanction Exitjk  = β0k + β1k Blackj + β2k Latinoj + β3k Number of Children(2)j  
+ β4k Number of Children(3 or more)j + β5k Age of Youngest Child(3 months-2 yrs.)j  
+ β6k Age of Youngest Child(3-4 years)j + β7k Age of Youngest Child(5-11 yrs.)j  
+ β8k Age of Youngest Child(12 or more)j + β9k Education(12 yrs..)j + β10k Education(>12 yrs..)j 
+ β11k Malej + β12k Citizenj + β13k Agej + β14k Single-Parentj + β15k Earned Incomej  
+ β16k Public Housingj  + β17kOASDIj  + β18kSSIj  + β19k Year2000j  + β20k Year2001j   
+ β21k Year2002j  + β22k Year2003j  + β23k Year2004j   + β24k Year2005j                                        [6] 
The county-level (level 2) model is represented below in equations 7-10. 
β0k =  γ00 + γ01Republican Vote Sharek + γ02Percent Blackk + γ03Percent Latinok +  γ04Per Capita  Incomek  
+ γ05Unemployment Ratek  +  ε0k                [7] 
β1k =  γ10 + γ11 Republican Vote Sharek +  ε1k                           [8] 
β2k =  γ20 + γ21 Republican Vote Sharek +  ε2k                                                 [9] 
βpk =  γp0       for p = 3-24                [10] 
Level 1 Hypotheses 
To test the simple disparity hypothesis, we once again classify clients as black, Latino, and white 
(non-Latino) and include the dichotomous variables Black and Latino. We expect the coefficient values 
will be positive for each of these variables (β1, β2 > 0), and the coefficient for Black will be larger than the 
coefficient for Latino (β1 > β2).  
We also include a number of other variables to control for variation in clients’ individual 
characteristics. Many of these variables are identical (or very similar) to the variables we included in our 
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analysis of Florida TANF clients. These include variables measuring the client’s gender (Male), 
citizenship status (Citizen), age (Age), the age of the youngest child in the TANF family, the number of 
children in the TANF family, the client’s marital status (Single-Parent), and two indicators of human 
capital (Earned Income and Education). We also take advantage of information in the national TANF 
dataset and include three additional indicators of client hardship. These include two dichotomous 
variables indicating whether a former TANF client received disability benefits through the Social Security 
or Supplemental Security Income programs (OASDI, SSI), and whether a TANF family lived in public 
housing (Public Housing). Finally, we include a series of dummy variables for the year that the TANF 
sample was collected.  
Level 2 Hypotheses 
As in our analysis of Florida TANF clients, we model the intercept of equation 6 (β0k) as a 
function of local political, economic and social conditions. To measure the local political context in the 
national data, we rely on the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote, averaged over the last 
three presidential elections (Republican Vote Share). We also control for the local racial context by 
including the percentage of the county population that is black and Latino, respectively (Percent Black, 
Percent Latino). To capture the effects of local economic conditions, we include the county 
unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate) and per capita income (Per Capita Income). Finally, we test the 
ideology-contingent disparity hypothesis by including Republican Vote Share as a predictor for the effects 
of Black (β1k) and Latino (β2k), as reflected in equations 8 and 9. As we expect racial disparities to be 
larger in conservative counties, we expect γ11 and γ21 to be positive.  
To test Hypothesis 4 (the Decentralization-Contingent Disparity Hypothesis), we estimate our 
model separately for the 36 state governments that administer TANF directly, and the 14 states that have 
devolved significant authority in TANF implementation to local governments or regional workforce 
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boards – i.e., states with second-order devolution (SOD) (Gainsborough 2003).9  For reasons outlined 
above, we expect that the effects of racial classification may be enhanced in SOD states, and as a result, 
racial classification may more likely to result in racial disparities in sanctioning outcomes. 
Results 
The results of our analyses are presented in Table 2. Once again, we find that sanctions are 
significantly related to clients’ individual traits, within both SOD and centralized (i.e. non-SOD) states.  
The probability of being sanctioned is higher for clients who are younger, who have older children (SOD 
states only), who are citizens, and who possess less human capital (as measured by education level and 
earned income). These results are generally consistent across SOD and non-SOD states, and they are 
generally consistent with our results from Florida.  However, the effects of several variables diverge from 
our initial findings from Florida. For example, gender plays no role in sanctioning in SOD states, and in 
centralized states it is women, as opposed to men, who are more likely to be sanctioned. In addition, while 
being a single parent has no effect on sanctioning in SOD states, we find that single parents are more 
likely (rather than less likely) to be sanctioned in centralized states. Finally, we see that clients who 
receive disability benefits or live in public housing are significantly more likely to have left TANF due to 
a sanction, perhaps reflecting significant employment barriers among these clients. 
[Table 2] 
Moving to our contextual variables, sanction exits are significantly more likely to occur in 
counties with larger black populations, as well as in counties with larger Latino populations (in 
centralized states). We find weaker effects for the local economic context, although the unemployment 
rate is positively related to sanction exits in centralized states.  
We now turn our attention to the tests of the simple disparity and ideology-contingent disparity 
hypotheses, and the relative performance of these hypotheses across SOD and centralized administrative 
environemnts. As in our initial analysis of TANF sanctioning among Florida clients, we centered 
                                                 
9 These 14 states include Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. 
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Republican Vote Share by subtracting its mean so that the coefficients for Black and Latino in Table 3 
reflect the effects of race and ethnicity in a typical (i.e., politically moderate) county. As we saw in 
Florida, the results for the national data find the effects of race and ethnicity to be insignificant in such a 
county, in both SOD and non-SOD states. However, this does not mean to suggest that racial disparities 
are entirely absent, as evidenced by the results of our test of the ideology-contingent hypothesis. As in our 
Florida analysis, our test of this hypothesis is based on the estimation of cross-level interactions between 
the racial/ethnic status of the client and our measure of local ideology (Republican Vote Share). Among 
black clients, the effect of racial status is indeed mediated by the ideological orientation of the local 
political environment. And consistent with theoretical expectations concerning the nature of the 
implementation environment, the effect is limited to SOD states. However, we find no interaction 
between ethnicity (Latino) and the local political environment in either sample of states.  
In Figure 6, we provide a graphical illustration of the relationship between race and sanctioning in 
SOD states which offers a clearer understanding of exactly how this relationship is mediated by local 
ideology. Figure 6 presents the predicted probability of a sanction exit for a typical client, by the race of 
the client and the local political environment.10 As we saw in Florida (see Figure 4), black clients and 
white clients are predicted to be sanctioned at more or less equivalent rates in the most liberal counties. 
But as we move to the right along the horizontal axis, we see that racial disparities quickly emerge in the 
anticipated direction. Given the consistency of this finding across two very different datasets and research 
designs, this result provides important confirmation of the mediating effects of local ideology and 
administrative decentralization, and ultimately, our Racial Classification Model of policy choice. 
 [Figure 6] 
CONCLUSION 
 
Poverty governance in the United States has been redefined over the past several decades by a 
turn to more custodial and paternalist policy approaches. Today, low-income Americans confront a web 
                                                 
10 We define a “typical” client as a U.S.-born 31 year-old single woman with 2 children (aged 5-12 years), less than 
12 years of education an average level of earned income, who resides in an average county (reflecting mean values 
on all of the contextual variables).   
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of policies that place greater emphasis on behavioral expectations, supervision, and disciplinary action. 
Leading scholars have called for greater efforts to theorize this “penalization of poverty” (Wacquant 
2001) and for more direct analyses of how paternalist rules and penalties are implemented at the 
administrative frontlines (Mead 2004). As students of American politics turn to these crucial tasks, we do 
so against a historical backdrop that makes discussion of race and local politics virtually unavoidable. 
Behavioral regulation and the maintenance of social order have traditionally been state and local functions 
under U.S. federalism (Lowi 1998), and race relations have often stood at the center of the local political 
dynamics that have shaped both poor relief and punishment (Lieberman 1998; Zimring 2003).  
The contemporary turn toward discipline, of course, occurs in a post-civil-rights era that is distant 
from earlier eras in which caste-like race relations drove overt practices of discrimination, exploitation, 
and oppression. Yet it remains tempting to fall back on these earlier eras as simplifying templates as we 
turn today to the question of how, if at all, race affects the official application of disciplinary policy tools. 
As Loic Wacquant (1997) has explained, scholarly analyses of race in the U.S. are frequently held captive 
by “the logic of the trial”: actors and institutions are held up to scrutiny and deemed racist or non-racist, 
discriminatory or unbiased, prejudiced or not. The effect of race is all encompassing or non-existent.  
In this paper, we have sought to replace such simplifying logics with a more subtle and 
contingent account of how race matters for the implementation of sanctions under contemporary welfare 
reform.  The evidence presented here provides striking confirmation that racial classification remains 
central to the operation of poverty governance in the United States. Yet our racial classification model of 
policy choice suggests, and our empirical results confirm, that racial disparities in treatment arise to a 
greater degree in some places than in others, and for some client subgroups more than others. Indeed, 
under some conditions specified here, black and Latino welfare recipients emerge as no more likely, or 
even less likely, than their white counterparts to be sanctioned. Minority disadvantage arises in the 
disciplinary process primarily as a function of community and client characteristics that heighten the 
degree of contrast associated with racial-group reputations. 
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In the welfare context, for example, long-term program usage is a discrediting mark that can 
associate a recipient with dependency, irresponsibility, and lack of effort. The toll imposed by this 
discrediting mark, however, turns out to vary across racial groups in our analysis. As TANF participation 
spells grow longer, it is minority, and especially black, clients who become increasingly subject to 
penalties. This result is consistent, not only with the RCM, but also with a line of experimental research 
suggesting that welfare reliance has different meanings when attached to blacks and whites (Gilens 1999) 
and that stigmatizing, stereotype-consistent cues interact with racial status to disadvantage blacks relative 
to whites (Pager 2003; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). In the Florida WT program, black-white 
disparities increase over the course of the participation spell, suggesting that blacks are disproportionately 
tainted by – and ultimately taxed for – the stigma of long-term program usage.  
Likewise, we find that racial disparities in sanctioning depend significantly on the local context.  
Larger disparities emerge in more ideologically conservative jurisdictions, and within administrative 
structures which delegate significant discretion to local decision-makers. Our interpretation of these 
results flows, once again, from the basic premises of the RCM.  According to this model, racial disparities 
in policy treatment should emerge to a greater degree in those times and places where officials are more 
likely to hold stereotypes that distinguish racial groups in policy-relevant ways, and where such officials 
are afforded a greater opportunity to translate those beliefs into policy outcomes.   
In addition to shedding light on when and how race matters for policy choice, these results have 
significant implications for the growing body of research on TANF implementation. Econometric 
analyses of TANF outcomes, including sanction rates, have generally ignored the political and 
organizational context of implementation. Our analysis suggests that such models may be under-specified 
in ways that produce a distorted picture of sanctioning processes and outcomes. Equally important, our 
analysis suggests a more troubling account of racial disparities than one often finds in many econometric 
studies. When prior studies have found racial disparities, it has been quite reasonable to ask whether the 
group differences were simply due to unobserved heterogeneity: perhaps the racial disparity only 
indicated that minority and white clients with similar demographic profiles actually behaved in different 
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ways. Our study calls attention to a different pattern of results.  We have not reported simply that a racial 
disparity exists that we cannot explain away based on our collection of demographic controls; we have 
found that the extent of racial disparities in sanctioning rises or falls systematically depending on the 
political environment. There is, of course, little reason to suspect that black-white or Latino-white 
differences in individual behavior would vary across liberal and conservative jurisdictions, or across 
administrative structures. Thus, the findings point to a racial effect that seems far harder to dismiss as not 
being “really” about race. 
Finally, we end with a broader point about the history of welfare provision. Scholars have often 
suggested that welfare has followed a “vicious cycle” in which social inequalities have shaped policy 
choices that, in turn, have recreated social inequalities (Mettler 1998; Lieberman 1998; Schram 2006). 
Negative images of a target group guide policy design and implementation, and policy designs are then 
implemented in ways that reinforce negative group outcomes and reputations (Schneider and Ingram 
1993; Schram 1995, 2005). The analysis presented here raises the prospect that such dynamics may be at 
work today in contemporary welfare reform. Racial politics contributed greatly to federal welfare reform 
in 1996 (Gilens 1999; Soss and LeClair 2004), which devolved substantial policy authority to the states. 
State policy choices regarding TANF rules and penalties were then significantly influenced by racial 
composition (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Fording 2003; Soss et al. 2001). Nationally, these racialized state 
choices resulted in black and Latino families being disproportionately concentrated in the policy regimes 
with the toughest rules and sanctions (Soss et al. 2003). And as we have shown, among the states that 
adopted the toughest sanctions, racial composition appears to have a significant relationship with the rates 
at which sanctions are applied. Moving further downward to the state and local level, our analysis 
suggests that race matters in substantial but variable ways for frontline decisions to impose discipline. 
Today as in the past, public aid for poor women and children remains entangled with the complex 
interplay of race, politics, and local policy control.  
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TABLE 1.  Discrete-Time Multilevel Event History Models of Sanction Initiation 
 
 
 Model 1     
                    
                    Odds 
       β           Ratio 
Model 2 
 
                   Odds 
      β           Ratio 
Intercept (β0k) Intercept (γ00)   -1.198** 0.384 -0.854** 0.426 
 Local Conservatism (γ01)    0.133 1.142 --- --- 
 Republican Vote Share (γ01) --- --- -0.003 0.997 
 Black% (γ02)   -0.005 0.995 -0.008 0.992 
 Latino% (γ03)   -0.001 0.999 -0.002 0.997 
 Annual Wage (γ04)   -0.038 0.963 -0.036 0.965 
 Unemployment Rate (γ05)    0.003 1.003  0.006 1.006 
 Poverty Rate (γ06)    0.040** 1.041  0.040** 1.041 
 Population (γ07)    0.295** 1.295  0.243** 1.243 
 TANF Caseload (γ08)   -0.227** 0.797 -0.235** 0.791 
 
Race/Ethnicity (reference=white) 
     
     Black (β1k) Intercept (γ10)   -0.041 0.960 -0.020 0.980 
 Local Conservatism (γ11)    0.371** 1.449 --- --- 
 Republican Vote Share (γ11) --- ---  0.007** 1.449 
     Latino (β2k) Intercept (γ20)   -0.139** 0.870 -0.101** 0.904 
 Local Conservatism (γ21)    0.376+ 1.458 --- --- 
 Republican Vote Share (γ21) --- ---  0.010* 1.010 
     Black * Month of Spell (β3k) Intercept (γ30)    0.065** 1.067  0.065** 1.067 
     Latino * Month of Spell (β4k) Intercept (γ40)    0.035** 1.035  0.035** 1.035 
 
Number of children  
(reference = 0 - 1): 
     
    Two (β5k) Intercept (γ50)   -0.024 0.976 -0.024 0.976 
    Three or more (β6k) Intercept (γ60)   -0.025 0.975 -0.025 0.975 
 
Age of youngest child  
(reference = 0 – 2 months): 
     
     3 months – 2 years (β7k) Intercept (γ70)   0.567** 1.763   0.567** 1.763 
     3 – 4 years (β8k) Intercept (γ80)   0.656** 1.927   0.656** 1.927 
     5 – 12 years (β9k) Intercept (γ90)   0.740** 2.097   0.740** 2.097 
     More than 12 years (β10k) Intercept (γ100)   0.758** 2.134   0.758** 2.134 
 
Education (reference = <H.S.) 
     
     H.S. Education (β11k) Intercept (γ110)  -0.322** 0.724  -0.323** 0.724 
     More than H.S. Education (β12k) Intercept (γ120)  -0.483** 0.617  -0.483** 0.617 
 
Male (β13k) 
 
Intercept (γ130) 
  
 0.190** 
 
1.209 
  
 0.190** 
 
1.209 
Citizen (β14k) Intercept (γ140)  0.154+ 1.166  0.154+ 1.166 
Age (β15k) Intercept (γ150) -0.022** 0.979 -0.022** 0.979 
Single-Parent (β16k) Intercept (γ160) -0.200** 0.819 -0.200** 0.819 
Wage Income (β17k) Intercept (γ170) -0.007 0.993  -0.007 0.993 
      
Number of Subjects (Level 1) 
Number of Failures 
Time at Risk (Person-Months) 
Number of Counties (Level 2) 
 74,517 
28,307 
198,147 
66 
74,517 
28,307 
198,147 
66 
            *p<.05, **p<.01, +p<.10 
Note: The analysis was conducted using HLM 6 (HLM2 module). The cell entries are binary logit coefficients, with 
significance levels determined based on robust standard errors. Each model includes dummy variables for the 
duration of spell (months 1-12). These results are not shown, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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TABLE 2.  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models of Sanction Exits, for TANF Clients in SOD and 
Centralized States  
 
 
 
    SOD           Centralized    
  States              States 
Intercept (β0k) Intercept (γ00)   -7.909**  -10.840** 
 Republican Vote% (γ01)    0.032** 0.040** 
 Black% (γ02)    0.021**     0.023** 
 Latino% (γ03)   -0.004     0.011** 
 Per Capita Income (γ04)    0.001    -0.000 
 Unemployment Rate (γ05)    0.016 0.070** 
 
Race/Ethnicity (reference=white) 
   
     Black (β1k) Intercept (γ10)    0.086 0.113 
 Republican Vote Share (γ11)    0.010* 0.001 
     Latino (β2k) Intercept (γ20)   -0.020 0.030 
 Republican Vote Share (γ21)    0.001 0.001 
 
Number of children (reference = 0 - one): 
   
    Two (β3k) Intercept (γ30)   0.120**   0.082** 
    Three or more (β4k) Intercept (γ40)   0.240**   0.163** 
 
Age of youngest child (reference = 0 – 2 months): 
   
     3 months – 2 years (β5k) Intercept (γ50)   -0.336**  0.659** 
     3 – 4 years (β6k) Intercept (γ60)   -0.038  0.724** 
     5 – 12 years (β7k) Intercept (γ70)   -0.072  0.720** 
     More than 12 years (β8k) Intercept (γ80)    0.016  0.689** 
 
Education (reference = <H.S.) 
   
     H.S. Education (β9k) Intercept (γ90)  -0.178** 0.252** 
     More than H.S. Education (β10k) Intercept (γ100)  -0.432** -0.392** 
 
Male (β11k) 
 
Intercept (γ110) 
  
  0.035 
 
-0.208** 
Citizen (β12k) Intercept (γ120)   0.407**     0.545** 
Age (β13k) Intercept (γ130)  -0.020** -0.020** 
Single-Parent (β14k) Intercept (γ140)   0.042  0.144** 
Earned Income (β15k) Intercept (γ150)  -0.001**    -0.002** 
Public Housing (β16k) Intercept (γ160)   0.089 0.183** 
OASDI (β17k) Intercept (γ170) 0.833** 1.061** 
SSI (β18k) Intercept (γ180) 1.357** 1.268** 
    
Number of Clients (Level 1) 
Number of Counties (Level 2) 
   44,691          151,457 
     963              1,708 
           *p<.05, **p<.01, +p<.10 
 
Note: The analysis was conducted using HLM 6 (HLM2 module). The cell entries are binary logit coefficients, with 
significance levels determined based on robust standard errors. Each model includes dummy variables for the year 
the state sample was collected (1999-2006). These results are not shown, but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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FIGURE 1. Scatterplot of the Relationship between the Racial/Ethnic Composition of the TANF 
Caseload and the Work-Related Sanction Rate, FY2002 
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Note: The sample for this analysis consists of the 14 states which enforced immediate, full-family 
sanctions in 2002. The horizontal axis is computed as the sum of the percentage of TANF families that 
are African-American and the percentage that are Hispanic, based on data reported for April, 2002. The 
vertical axis is the percentage of cases closed due to a work-related sanction during fiscal year 2002. 
These data are reported in the Sixth Annual Report to Congress, published by the Office of Family 
Assistance in the Department of Health and Human Services 
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/annualreport6/ar6index.htm). 
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FIGURE 2.  Average Gap in Perceived Laziness of Racial Groups, by Ideological Identification of 
Respondents 
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Note: The sample for this analysis is taken from 2004 National Election Study and includes respondents 
of all races. The vertical axis represents the difference in the mean assessment of laziness for each pair of 
target groups (the mean score for blacks/Hispanics minus the mean score for white), where the laziness 
scale is coded as follows: 1=hardworking thought 7=lazy. 
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FIGURE 3.  Odds Ratio of Sanction for Florida TANF Clients across the TANF Spell (Baseline = 
Month 1 of TANF Spell) 
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FIGURE 4.  Predicted Probability of Being Sanctioned for Florida TANF Clients, by Race, Local 
Political Environment and Month of TANF Spell  
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FIGURE 5. Predicted Probability of Being Sanctioned for Florida TANF Clients, by Ethnicity, 
Local Political Environment and Month of TANF Spell 
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FIGURE 6. Predicted Probability of Sanction in Second-Order Devolution States, by Race 
of Client and Local Political Environment 
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Note: Predicted probabilities were calculated based on the results presented in Table 3, for the SOD 
sample of states. 
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Table A1. Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Presented in Table 1 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Definition   
              
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Minimum- 
Maximum 
 
Individual characteristics: 
    
 
Gender 0 = female, 1 = male .159 .366 0-1 
 
Age Client age (in years)                                                          31.6 9.2 18-72 
 
Marital status 
1 = single parent, 0=otherwise, based on no. of adults 
in family .751 .432 0-1 
 
Number of children (ref. =  0 - 1):     
     
    Two 1 = 2 children, 0 = otherwise .278 .448 0-1 
     
    Three or more 1 = 3 or more, 0 = otherwise .210 .408 0-1 
 
Age of youngest child  (ref. = 0 – 2 months):     
      
    3 months – 2 years 1 = 3 months – 2 years, 0 = otherwise  .356 .479 0-1 
      
    3 – 4 years  1 = 3 – 4 years, 0 = otherwise .125 .331 0-1 
      
    5 – 12 years 1 = 5 – 12 years, 0 = otherwise .310 .463 0-1 
      
    More than 12 years 1 = more than 12 years, 0 = otherwise .110 .312 0-1 
 
Wage income Wage income, from previous quarter, in 1,000s .530 1.489 0-200 
 
Education (ref. = more than 12 years): 
    
      
    Less than H.S. 1= less than 12 years, 0 = otherwise  .472 .499 0-1 
       
    H.S.  1= 12 years, 0 = otherwise .346 .476 0-1 
 
Race or ethnicity (ref. = white, non-Latino): 
 
 
   
      
    Black 1 = black,  0 = otherwise .358 .480 0-1 
      
    Latino 
 
1 = Latino, 0 = otherwise .304 .460 0-1 
 
Political environment: 
    
 
County conservatism index See Appendix B .465 .220 0-1 
 
County black population (%) 
 
Percentage of blacks in county of client in 2000 
(County and City Data Books 2003)   16.2 6.9 2.1 –  57.1 
County Latino population (%) Percentage of Latinos in county of client in 2000 
(County and City Data Books 2003) 22.9 21.7 1.5 – 57.3 
Socioeconomic environment:     
 
Annual Wage in food service and drinking places 
 
Average annual income in 1997 for employees in 
NAICS subsector 722, in 1,000s (County and City 
Data Books 2003) 
 
 
 
12.9 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
7.8 – 16.7 
County unemployment rate (t-1) Unemployment rate in county of client, measured 
each month (Florida Research and Economic 
Database) 
 
 
  5.6 
 
 
1.7 
 
 
1.7 – 19.7 
County poverty rate County poverty rate for all persons in 2000 (U.S. 
Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates) 
 
 
13.1 
 
 
3.5 
 
 
6.9 – 24.2 
 County TANF caseload (t-1) Number of TANF recipients per 100,000 county 
residents (calculated by authors) 
 
  2.28 
 
  1.17 
 
.142 - 6.907 
County population (in millions) Total county population in 2000, in 1000’s (County 
and City Data Books 2003) 
 
 1072 
 
  825 
 
7.02  -  2253 
Source: Data on client characteristics were provided by the Florida Department of Children and Families. 
 Table A2. Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Presented in Table 2 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Definition   
Centralized  States 
    Mean                    S.D. 
SOD States 
     Mean                       S.D. 
      
Individual Level Variables      
 
Race/Ethnicity 
(reference=white) 
     
     Black 1 = black,  0 = otherwise 0.283 0.450 0.405 0.491 
     Latino 1 = Latino, 0 = otherwise 0.109 0.312 0.158 0.365 
 
Number of children  
(reference = 0 - one): 
     
    Two 1 = 2 children, 0 = otherwise 0.280 0.449 0.278 0.448 
    Three or more 1 = 3 or more, 0 = otherwise 0.193 0.395 0.197 0.397 
 
Age of youngest child  
(reference = 0 – 2 months): 
     
     3 months – 2 years 1 = 3 months – 2 years, 0 = 
otherwise 0.371 0.483 0.377 0.485 
     3 – 4 years 1 = 3 – 4 years, 0 = otherwise 0.140 0.347 0.144 0.351 
     5 – 12 years 1 = 5 – 12 years, 0 = otherwise 0.285 0.452 0.281 0.450 
     More than 12 years 1 = more than 12 years, 0 = 
otherwise 0.101 0.302 0.094 0.292 
 
Education (reference = <H.S.) 
     
     H.S. Education 1= less than 12 years, 0 = otherwise  0.463 0.499 0.319 0.466 
     More than H.S. Education 1= 12 years, 0 = otherwise 0.050 0.219 0.041 0.198 
 
Male  0 = female, 1 = male 
 
0.160 
 
0.367 
 
0.234 
 
0.423 
Citizen  1 = Citizen, 0 = otherwise 0.956 0.206 0.943 0.232 
Age  Client age (in years) 31.144 10.223 30.670 8.948 
Single-Parent 1 = single parent, 0=otherwise 0.763 0.425 0.755 0.430 
Earned Income Amount of earned income in 
previous month 278.462 522.513 211.486 447.322 
Public Housing 1 = Public housing recipient, 0 = 
otherwise 0.077 0.266 0.061 0.239 
OASDI 1= Social Security recipient, 0 = 
otherwise 0.022 0.145 0.033 0.178 
SSI 1 = SSI recipient, 0 = otherwise 0.010 0.100 0.036 0.188 
      
County Level Variables      
Republican Vote% Percentage of vote for Republican 
presidential candidate in general 
election, 1996 and 2000 44.372 11.765 43.955 13.224 
Black%  
Percentage of blacks in county of 
client in 2000 (County and City 
Data Books 2003) 11.658 16.000 16.349 17.606 
Latino% Percentage of Latinos in county of 
client in 2000 (County and City 
Data Books 2003) 7.174 9.257 11.895 15.738 
Per Capita Income County per capita income in 2000 
(County and City Data Books 2003) 49.975 18.990 53.966 21.652 
Unemployment Rate  County unemployment rate in 2000 
(County and City Data Books 2003) 4.429 2.413 4.507 2.234 
Source: Data on client characteristics are from TANF Administrative Dataset, available from ASPE. 
 
Table A3. Construction of Index of County Political Ideology  
 
 
 To construct our index of local ideology we collected data on 18 ideologically relevant 
constitutional amendments that appeared on a statewide ballot for ratification from 1996 through 2004.  
We computed the percentage of “yes” votes for each amendment, for each county, and conducted a factor 
analysis using all 18 amendments (thus 18 variables, N=67 counties). The specific amendments are listed 
in the table below. 
 
 
Ballot Title 
Election 
Year 
Ballot 
Number 
 
To Amend 
 
Should Two-Thirds Vote be Required for New 
Constitutionally-Imposed State Taxes/Fees? 
 
 
1996 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 1 
 
 
Art. XI, sec. 7 
 
Fee on Everglades Sugar Production 
 
1996 
Constitutional 
Amendment 4 
 
Art. VII, sec. 9 
 
Responsibility for Paying Costs for Water Pollution 
Abatement in the Everglades 
 
 
1996 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 5 
 
 
Art. II, sec. 7 
 
Preservation of the Death Penalty; United States Supreme 
Court Interpretation of Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 
 
1998 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 2 
 
 
Art. I, sec. 17 
 
Additional Homestead Tax Exemption 
 
1998 
Constitutional 
Amendment 3 
 
Art. VII, sec. 6 
 
Public Education of Children 
 
1998 
Constitutional 
Amendment 6 
 
Art. IX, sec. 1 
 
Basic Rights 
 
1998 
Constitutional 
Amendment 9 
 
Art. I, sec. 2 
 
 
 
Ballot Access, Public Campaign Financing, and Election 
Process Revisions 
 
 
 
 
1998 
 
 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 11 
 
Art. IV, sec. 5a; 
Art. VI, subsecs. 
1,2,5,7; Art. IX, 
sec. 4a 
 
Firearms Purchases: Local Option for Criminal History 
Records Check and Waiting Period 
 
 
1998 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 12 
 
 
Art. VIII, sec. 5 
 
Florida Transportation Initiative for Statewide High Speed 
Monorail, Fixed Guideway of Magnetic Levitation System 
 
 
2000 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 1 
 
 
Art. X, sec. 19 
 
Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand 
Tobacco Smoke by Prohibiting Workplace Smoking 
 
 
2002 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 6 
 
 
Art. X, sec. 20 
 
Voluntary Universal Pre-Kindergarten Education 
 
2002 
Constitutional 
Amendment 8 
 
Art. IX, sec. 1 
 
Florida’s Amendment to Reduce Class Size 
 
2002 
Constitutional 
Amendment 9 
 
Art. IX, sec. 1 
 
Animal Cruelty Amendment: Limiting Cruel and Inhumane 
Confinement of Pigs during Pregnancy 
 
 
2002 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 10 
 
 
Art. X, sec. 19 
 
Parental Notification of a Minor’s Termination of Pregnancy 
 
2004 
Constitutional 
Amendment 1 
 
Art. X, sec. 22 
 
Florida Minimum Wage Amendment 
 
2004 
Constitutional 
Amendment 5 
 
Art. X 
 
The Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation Amendment  
 
2004 
Constitutional 
Amendment 3 
 
Art. I, sec. 26 
 
Authorizes Miami-Dade and Broward County Voters to 
Approve Slot Machines in Parimutuel Facilities 
 
 
2004 
 
Constitutional 
Amendment 4 
 
 
Art. X, sec. 19 
    
 
 
 
Table A4.  Discrete-Time Event History Models of Sanction Initiation [Replication of Table 1 Using 
Logistic Regression with Clustered Standard Errors] 
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Model I 
 
                     Odds 
 Coeff.        Ratio   
Model II 
 
                    Odds 
  Coeff.        Ratio 
     
Individual Characteristics     
Male  .1898** 1.2090  .1906** 1.2100 
Citizen  .1535 1.1659  .1535 1.1600 
Age -.0129**   .9783 -.0219**   .9783 
Single-Parent -.1965**   .8216 -.1946**   .8231 
Number of children (reference = 0 - one):     
    Two -.0191  .9810 -.0195   .9807 
    Three or more -.0207  .9795 -.0206   .9796 
Age of youngest child (reference = 0 – 2 months):     
     3 months – 2 years .5679** 1.7646  .5672** 1.7634 
     3 – 4 years .6529** 1.9212  .6521** 1.9195 
     5 – 12 years .7379** 2.0914  .7373** 2.0881 
     More than 12 years .7596** 2.1373  .7586** 2.1353 
Wage Income -.0102*   .9898 -.0103*   .9898 
Education (reference = >H.S.)     
     Less than H.S. Education .4764** 1.6103  .4784** 1.6135 
     H.S. Education .1515** 1.1635  .1526** 1.1649 
Race/Ethnicity (reference=white)     
     Black -.0470  .9541 -.0198   .9804 
     Black * Month of Spell .0663** 1.0685  .0656** 1.0678 
     Hispanic -.1486**  .8618 -.0883   .9154 
     Hispanic * Month of Spell  .0374** 1.0381  .0371** 1.0378 
 
Political Environment 
    
Local Conservatism  .2000 1.2214 --- --- 
Local Conservatism*Black  .4761** 1.6098 --- --- 
Local Conservatism*Hispanic  .3716 1.4500 --- --- 
Republican Vote Share --- ---  .0003 1.0003 
Republican Vote Share*Black --- ---  .0092** 1.0092 
Republican Vote Share*Hispanic --- ---  .0112** 1.0113 
Black% -.0051  .9949 -.0060   .9940 
Hispanic% -.0081*  .9920 -.0096**   .9905 
 
Socio-Economic Environment 
    
Annual Wage - Food Service/Drinking Places -.0402  .9606 -.0451*   .9559 
Unemployment Rate  .0032 1.0032  .0065 1.0066 
∆Unemployment Rate -.0067  .9934 -.0038   .9962 
Poverty Rate  .0395** 1.0403  .0347* 1.0353 
Population  .0003** 1.0003  .0003** 1.0003 
 TANF Caseload  -.1785**  .8365 -191.0**   .8261 
     
Number of Subjects 
Number of Failures 
Time at Risk (Person-Months) 
74,517 
28,307 
198,147 
74,517 
28,307 
198,147 
                                    *p<.05, **p<.01 
 
Note: Coefficient values are estimated using binary logit, with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county 
level. The sample consists of all new adult TANF recipients in Florida who entered TANF from January 2001 
through December 2002. Each model includes dummy variables for the duration of spell (months 1-12) and for 
calendar month (January-December) to capture potential seasonal effects. These results are not shown, but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
FIGURE A1. The Effect of Race on TANF Sanctioning by Local Conservatism (Second-Stage 
Results from Two-Stage Multilevel Model)  
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Note: The vertical axis reflects probit coefficient values for the effect of race of client on TANF 
sanctioning (equivalent to the effect of Black from Table 1), obtained from individual-level (first-stage) 
probit regressions estimated for 66 Florida counties. The horizontal axis is the county conservatism index. 
The symbols in the scatterplot are weighted based on the sample sizes from the first-stage probit 
regressions. The slope of the regression line (b = .38, t = 2.88) was estimated using the weights proposed 
by Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A2. The Effect of Ethnicity (Hispanic) on TANF Sanctioning by District Conservatism 
(Second-Stage Results from Two-Stage Multilevel Model) 
 
 
Note: The vertical axis reflects probit coefficient values for the effect of ethnicity of client on TANF 
sanctioning (equivalent to the effect of Hispanic from Table 1), obtained from individual-level (first-
stage) probit regressions estimated for 24 workforce districts. The horizontal axis is the district 
conservatism index, calculated by averaging county conservatism scores within each district (weighting 
by county population). The symbols in the scatterplot are weighted based on the sample sizes from the 
first-stage probit regressions. The slope of the regression line (b = .29, t = 2.08) was estimated using the 
weights proposed by Borjas and Sueyoshi (1994).  
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